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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the denial of a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus. The petition was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County before Judge Leonard
H. Russon.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah

Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower Court err in its finding that the

plaintiff had been afforded all of the appropriate constitutional
protection at his parole violation hearing?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
§ 77-27-25(3)

Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):

The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons in
cases involving approval or denial of any action, of paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution,
are final and are not subject to judicial review.

Nothing in

this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil
judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 1989, the appellant filed a Petition for Writ
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of Habeas Corpus with the Third Judicial District Court.

(R. 2)

The respondents filed an answer (R. 19), a motion to dismiss (R.
22), and a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss (R.
15).

Counsel was appointed to represent the appellant (R. 14).

Counsel for the appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the
state's motion to dismiss (R. 24). A hearing was held before
Judge Leonard H. Russon on May 9, 1989 (R. 36). The Court made
findings of fact, conclusions of law (R.56) and ordered the
petition dismissed (R. 59). Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
(R. 61).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant appeared before the Utah State Board of Pardons on
March 1, 1989 for a parole violation hearing.
specific allegations made.

There were five

The appellant admitted two of those

allegations, and the appellant was found to be in violation of
his parole agreement.

The board then revoked the appellant's

parole, and he was returned to the Utah State Prison.
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
primarily alleging that he had been inadequately represented by
counsel at the parole violation hearing.

The defendants

responded, claiming that the appellant had been adequately
afforded the appropriate constitutional rights attendant to a
parole violation hearing and that the Court was not free to
2

review the Board of Pardons decisions.

The Court held a hearing

and dismissed the petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant fails to attack any of the specific findings
of fact or conclusions of law made by the lower court. The
appellant was represented by counsel at all of the proceedings in
this case, particularly the parole revocation hearing and the
hearing on the motion to dismiss his petition.

The appellant was

given appropriate notice of the parole revocation hearing, was
given a chance to be heard at that hearing to contest any of the
allegations made against him.

The board's subsequent decision to

revoke the appellant's parole is not further subject to judicial
review, being precluded by § 77-27-5(3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE APPELLANT FAILS TO CHALLENGE ANY SPECIFIC FINDING

OF FACT OR CONCLUSION OF LAW.
Appellant has not attacked any of the findings of fact or
conclusions of law. Without doing so, the appellant provides
this Court no mechanism to reverse the lower court's ruling.
This principle has been clarified by this Court in the case of
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 50
(Ct. App. 1989).

Therein the Court stated:

In order to challenge a trial court's
findings of fact, a party "must marshal the
3

evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 105 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3,4 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). (further citations omitted).
Appellants often overlook or disregard this
heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is
not properly discharged, we refuse to
consider the merits of challenges to the
findings and accept the findings as valid.
Id. at 51.
Appellant's burden is to establish that the trial court's
findings of fact were "clearly erroneous."

The appellant has

neither made the requisite allegation of error, nor made a
demonstration of such before this Court.
The Court made specific findings of fact that the appellant
had been given adequate notice of the hearing, had been given
adequate notice of the alleged parole violations.

The Court

found further that the appellant had appeared at the hearing at
the appointed time, and being represented by counsel, admitted
two of the allegations against himself.

The Court found that the

appellant had been allowed to address the board both personally,
and through counsel.

(R. 57) The Court concluded as a matter of

law that more was not required under Utah law.

In making these

findings the Court relied somewhat upon the transcript provided
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to the Court of the parole revocation hearing (R. 41-55).

The

Court noted in its memorandum decision:
[0]ne placed on parole is entitled to
certain minimal procedural protections in
regards to issues as to whether or not his
parole should be revoked. Brimhall v.
Turner, 28 Utah 2d 321, 502 P.2d 116.
In this case, petitioner had notice of the
parole revocation hearing and the charges
against him, the right to and utilization of
legal counsel, and the opportunity to be
heard. After conferring with his legal
counsel, the petitioner admitted allegation
two (assault) and allegation four (consuming
alcohol). Three other allegations brought
against the petitioner were dismissed.
The transcript indicate a discussion
between the Parole Board and counsel for the
petitioner, as well as with petitioner
personally. Petitioner was given an
opportunity to speak.
Memorandum Decision (R. 38). The trial Court specifically looked
to the constitutional protections required at a parole revocation
hearing, and made specific findings of fact that they had been
afforded the appellant.

The appellant's brief fails to address

those specific findings of fact, and falls far short of meeting
his burden of showing that those findings were "clearly
erroneous."
Since the findings of fact remain have not been assailed,
the lower Court's conclusions of law retain their underpinnings
as well, and need not be reviewed by this Court.

The Court below

specifically concluded that "the plaintiff was afforded with all
5

of the necessary minimal procedural protections required at his
parole revocation hearing." (R. 58) The Court also concluded
that there was no statutory authority to review the Board of
Pardons' decision to revoke the appellant's parole, since that
decision itself is singularly up to the board.
POINT II. THE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT REVIEW
THE BOARD OF PARDONS' DECISION REVOKING THE APPELLANT'S PAROLE.
The Court's first conclusion of law was that "§ 77-27-5(3)
precludes it from reviewing the determinations and decisions of
the Board of Pardons." (R. 57). That section provides:
The determinations and decisions of the
Board of Pardons in cases involving approval
or denial of any action, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence,
orders of restitution, or remission of fines,
forfeitures, and restitution, are final and
are not subject to judicial review....
§ 77-27-5(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
Accordingly, the Judge Russon ruled:

"This Court cannot weigh

the merits of the Parole Board's decision, since that is solely
within its province."

(Memorandum Decision, R. 39). This Court

similarly should decline review of the Board of Pardons decision
revoking the appellant's parole.
POINT III. APPELLANT IMPROPERLY RAISES NEW ISSUES AND SEEKS
REMEDIES WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE THIS COURT.
It is axiomatic that issues which were not raised in a lower
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court will not be first heard on appeal (See: Bangerter v.
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), and that the appellate court's
spectra of remedies does not extend past review of the lower
court's findings, conclusions, and orders.

The appellant's

initial petition included merely a prayer for a determination
that his incarceration was unlawful and illegal based upon the
claimed errors at his parole violation hearing.

(R. 3). The

appellant's brief, however, makes a number of specific requests
which are not before this Court.

For example, the appellant

requests an autopsy report, police reports, tax records,
injunctive relief, damages, and a declaration of mistrial on his
original conviction.

All of these requests are well beyond the

scope of the original writ and outside the bounds of what this
Court may now consider.

The Court is therefore respectfully

urged to deny these request as not being properly presented.

SUMMARY
The appeal must fail for a couple of reasons.

First of all,

the appellant has failed to specifically challenge any finding of
fact or conclusion of law upon which the order was based.

The

original petition was merely an effort to get the District Court
to reverse the Parole Board's decision to revoke the petitioner's
parole.

The lower Court properly concluded that it should not.
7

The remaining requests of the appellant are not properly before
the Court and ought to be denied.
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